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Landlord-Tenant: Proving Motive in Retaliatory Eviction
-Minnesota's Solution
In 1971 the Minnesota legislature enacted a statute de-
signed to protect tenants who have pursued their legal rights
from retaliatory eviction.' The statute, in accord with the na-
tional trend in landlord-tenant law toward enhancing the rights
of low-income tenants,2 prohibited any eviction intended as a
penalty for a tenant's good faith attempts to invoke a wide range
of rights and remedies3 and demonstrated the legislature's pref-
erence for a statutory rather than case-by-case approach to
1. 1971 Minn. Laws ch. 240, § 1 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 566.03
(1974)) (amended by 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 17, § 1). The text of the 1971
statute was identical to the version set out below, with the exception of
the italicized phrases which were added by the amendment of 1976, see
text accompanying notes 6-8 infra.
Subd. 1. [Describes the circumstances under which the
landlord can recover possession.]
Subd. 2. It shall be a defense to an action for recovery of
premises following the alleged termination of a tenancy by
notice to quit for the defendant to prove by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence that:
(1) The alleged termination was intended in whole or
part as a penalty for the defendant's good faith attempt to secure
or enforce rights under a lease or contract, oral or written, or
under the laws of the state, any of its governmental subdivisions,
or of the United States, or(2) The alleged termination was intended in whole or part
as a penalty for the defendant's good faith report to a govern-
mental authority of the plaintiff's violation of any health, safety,
housing or building codes or ordinances.
If the notice to quit was served within 90 days of the date
of any act of the tenant coming within the terms of clauses (1)
or (2) the burden of proving that the notice to quit was not
served in whole or part for a retaliatory purpose shall rest with
the plaintiff.
Subd. 3. In any proceeding for the restitution of premises
upon the ground of nonpayment of rent, it shall be a defense
thereto if the tenant establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the plaintiff increased the tenant's rent or decreased
the services as a penalty in whole or part for any lawful act of
the tenant as described in subdivision 2, providing that the
tenant tender to the court or to the plaintiff the amount of rent
due and payable under his original obligation.
Subd. 4. Nothing contained herein shall limit the right of
the lessor pursuant to the provisions of subdivision 1 to termi-
nate a tenancy for a violation by the tenant of a lawful, material
provision of a lease or contract, whether written or oral, or to
hold the tenant liable for damage to the premises caused by the
tenant or a person acting under his direction or control.
2. See text accompanying notes 12-24 infra.
3. MwN. STAT. §§ 566.03 (2) (1)-(2) (1974); see note 1 supra.
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retaliatory eviction. 4 Most significant was the provision that
notice to quit served within 90 days of activity protected by the
statute placed the burden of showing lack of retaliatory motive
on the landlord.5
The statute provided no standard for determining the pre-
cise role retaliation had to play in the landlord's decision
in order for a retaliatory eviction defense to succeed. Trial
courts tended to construe the statute narrowly, permitting evic-
tions even where retaliatory motive was established. 6 This
spurred tenants' rights groups to lobby for an amendment that
would clarify and strengthen the statutory standard.7 In 1976
they succeeded: the legislature amended Minnesota Statutes
§ 566.03 to prohibit evictions intended in whole or part as a
penalty for engaging in statutorily protected activity." The
language of the amendment, a clear directive to courts to bring
life and meaning to the retaliatory eviction defense, implies
that evidence of even the slightest desire to retaliate against
tenants will prevent a landlord from evicting even if he has
other, entirely valid, nonretaliatory reasons. The history of this
statute and related litigation involving the retaliatory eviction
4. Interview with Professor Robert Stein, University of Minnesota
Law School, in Minneapolis (Dec. 6, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Stein In-
terview]; Interview with Bruce Beneke, Staff Attorney of the Ramsey
County Legal Assistance Center, in St. Paul (Oct. 26, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Beneke Interview]. Although representatives of Minneapolis
and St. Paul tenant unions at first proposed that a landlord be allowed
to evict only for just cause, determined political opposition forced them
to abandon this position. They then turned to protection from retaliatory
eviction to enhance tenants' rights. After extensive research on other
states' retaliatory eviction statutes, focusing primarily on those of Michi-
gan, Washington, Ohio, and Oregon, the tenants' representatives chose
Michigan's statute as the best model for the Minnesota law. The final
legislation, reflecting the need for responsible management of urban
housing, resulted from a rare cooperative effort by tenant unions and
representatives of large professional landlords.
5. MIN. STAT. § 566.03(2) (2) (1974) (amended by 1976 Minn.
Laws ch. 17, § 1); see note 1 supra.
6. Even after the enactment of the statute, some trial courts, de-
spite evidence that the notice to quit was given in retaliation for pro-
tected acts, allowed evictions where landlords claimed their reasons for
evicting were that the tenants owned a dog or occasionally had loud par-
ties. See Memorandum from Senator Ralph Doty to All Legislators and
Other Interested Persons Regarding S.F. 1362 (H.F. 1145), Minn. Legis.,
69th Sess. 1 (1976) (on file at MINNEsoTA LAw REVmw).
7. See Stein Interview, supra note 4; Beneke interview, supra
note 4.
8. 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 17, § 1 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 566.03
(1976)); see note 1 supra.
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defense highlight some of the difficulties that courts and legis-
latures have faced in their search for a rule that would balance
equitably the needs of tenants for decent, affordable shelter and
the needs of landlords to realize a return from their investment.
Retaliatory eviction law developed from a conviction that in
a tightly restricted housing market the balance of bargaining
power was unfairly weighted in favor of landlords. Consistently
enforced housing codes can mitigate the adverse effects of this
disparity in bargaining power, but they depend for their effec-
tiveness on private reporting of violations. Enforcement would
be seriously jeopardized if landlords could evict tenants who re-
port violations to the housing authorities. 10 Furthermore, a ten-
ant who is evicted after obtaining an order compelling his land-
lord to perform repairs is denied the benefit of his efforts. Al-
though he could bring an action for damages following such an
eviction, he could not be fully compensated for the delay, dislo-
cation, and hardship of finding a new home.1 '
In Edwards v. Habib,'2 the original and highly influential
retaliatory eviction case, Judge Skelly Wright concluded that
public policy and congressional intent to alleviate housing prob-
lems in the District of Columbia compelled recognition of retal-
iatory eviction as a defense to an unlawful detainer action. 13
9. Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1976). The Parkin
interpretation of Minnesota's 1971 retaliatory eviction statute occurred af-
ter passage of the 1976 amendment. See note 43 infra.
10. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969). See also Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in Califor-
nia: A Study in Frustration, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 287 (1970); Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 Gzo. L.J. 519,
541-42 (1966); Note, Retaliatory Eviction and the Reporting of Hous-
ing Code Violations in the District of Columbia, 36 GEo. WASH. L. Rav.
190 (1967).
11. See note 23 infra.
12. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).'
13. Id. at 699-703. The Edwards decision gave an energetic stimu-
lus to the trend toward counteracting the traditionally pro-landlord bias
of the common law. Previously, the doctrine of caveat emptor applied
to transactions in real property, since in pre-industrial society most im-
portant defects in land and buildings were easily discernible. See Quinn
& Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 225 (1969);
Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 670 (1966). The landlord had no duty to deliver tenant-
able dwellings. The common law implied no guarantees of habitability
or repair, and if the landlord covenanted to repair the property and failed
to do so, the tenant was not relieved of his obligation to pay rent. See,
e.g., Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (1914).
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Although Judge Wright's improvisation was greeted with disdain
in some quarters, 14 the overall reaction to the decision was
highly favorable. 15 Many courts, however, have been unwilling
to base the defense on implied statutory intent or general
policy grounds. The New York court in Toms Point Apart-
ments v. Goudzwardl6 declared that the retaliatory eviction
defense has constitutional foundations. The tenant's freedom to
discuss building conditions with other tenants, hold meetings,
form tenant associations, and inform public officials of com-
plaints was characterized as a first amendment right.17  The
court nonetheless imposed on tenants the burden of proving four
other elements in addition to infringement of a constitutional
right in order to prevail in a summary possession action.' s The
Toms Point case is a curious twist on Edwards, for although the
court in Toms Point brought a wide range of tenant activities
under the protective umbrella of the constitution, it set up addi-
tional barriers to the assertion of the defense and thereby frus-
trated the expansion of tenant rights that the statutory and policy
arguments in Edwards were designed to achieve.
14. See, e.g., 82 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1969); 44 NOTES DAME LAw 286
(1968).
15. See, e.g., Note, Emerging Landlord Liability: A Judicial Re-
evaluation of Tenant Remedies, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 387 (1971); Com-
ment, Tenant's Remedies in the District of Columbia: New Hope for
Reform, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 80 (1968).
16. 72 Misc. 2d 629, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Nassau County Ct. 1972).
17. Id. at 633, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 286. One problem of treating retalia-
tory eviction as a matter of constitutional law is the need to find state
action in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Toms Point court
did not articulate the rationale on which it believed it could reach the
acts of private landlords, but it quoted with approval Hosey v. Club Van
Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), which had held that use
of the summary possession proceeding to effectuate an eviction in retalia-
tion for the tenants' exercise of their constitutional rights was state ac-
tion. Id. at 630, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 284. Cf. McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971) (state control of the operation of a housing project,
along with the resulting financial benefit to the state, was state action
under the theory of Burton v. Wilmington Park Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961)). But see Aluli v. Trusdell, 54 Hawaii 417, 508 P.2d 1215, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973) (no state action in similar circumstances)
(noted in Comment, Aluli v. Trusdell: A Backward Step in the Fight
Against Retaliatory Eviction, 1973 UTAH L. Rsv. 503).
18. In addition to proving that his constitutional rights are being
abused, the tenant must prove that: (1) the grievance that had
prompted his complaint was serious, reasonable, and factual; (2) he did
not create the condition of which he complains; (3) the grievance existed
at the time the landlord brought his action for possession; and (4) the
landlord's overriding reason for the eviction was retaliation for the ten-
ant's exercise of his constitutional rights. 72 Misc. 2d at 632-33, 339
N.Y.S.2d at 286.
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State legislatures have not been content to ground retaliato-
ry eviction law in the intricacies of constitutional theory,19 and
have broadened protection of tenants beyond the minimum con-
stitutional guarantees. 20  All statutes protect from eviction ten-
ants who report housing code violations,21 but some states have
refused to extend the protection any further.2 2 The Minnesota
19. Reliance on constitutional arguments for the retaliatory eviction
defense might even prove to be counterproductive: the expansion of ten-
ants' rights would be inhibited if it were necessary to establish a consti-
tutional basis for every right sought to be enforced. Although one might
expect that the enactment of a statute specifying remedies for attempted
unlawful evictions would supercede prior case law, this has not always
been true. For an argument that statutory and judicial remedies may
be complementary rather than mutually exclusive, see Comment, Cal-
ifornia's Common Law Defense Against Landlord Retaliatory Conduct,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1161, 1169-73 (1975).
20. Currently, 24 states and the District of Columbia have retalia-
tory eviction statutes. They vary significantly in their efficacy as a
means of protecting tenants from retaliation. The Illinois statute, en-
acted in 1963, was the first in the nation, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71
(Smith-Hurd 1971), and, compared to some of the more recent additions
to the list, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 83.56-.60 (West Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1976);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.240 (Supp. 1975), is one of the most rudi-
mentary. For a table comparing the features of some of these laws, see
Comment, Retaliatory Eviction-The Unsolved Problem---Clore v. Fred-
man, 25 DEPAuL L. REV. 522, 532 (1976). See also the comprehensive
but somewhat outdated list found in Note, Developments in Contempo-
rary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 689, 710 (1973).
A recent California case suggests that, despite the presence of statu-
tory protection, tenant interests may not always be properly safeguarded.
In S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 54 Cal. App. 3d 868, 126 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1976), several migrant workers decided to strike pursuant to their
rights under a federal migrant labor act. They were evicted from their
grower-owned dwellings within a few days of stopping work. Through
a strange twist of logic the court held that they were not pursuing rights
related to the right to possession of the dwelling; rather, their legal
action focused on rights to improved wages and working conditions as
guaranteed by federal law, and complete relief could be obtained in a
federal forum. The dissent wisely pointed out the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing a person's status as a migrant worker from his status as a
tenant; migrant workers' rights as tenants were being infringed by their
exercise of their rights as workers under federal law.
Statutes themselves may not shield the tenant from retaliation
sufficiently to stimulate his legal activism. While the Minnesota leg-
islature has taken an expansive and innovative view of tenants' rights,
see note 1 supra, some states protect only reports of violations of local
housing codes or applicable health and safety statutes. See notes 21-
22 infra and accompany text.
21. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-33 (West Supp. 1977);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,§ 1700-1 (Purdon Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1975).
22. In some states such reports must be made to a specific enforce-
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statute is particularly favorable to tenants, shielding not only
reports of code violations, but also attempts to enforce rights
under the lease or under state or federal law.2 3 The judicial ap-
ment agency. See, e.g., HAwAII REV. STAT. § 521-74 (Supp. 1975);
ME. Rzv. STAT. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1975). In at least one state
the tenant's defense will fail unless the landlord was officially noti-
fied of the violations by the housing authorities prior to the time the
notice to quit was sent. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540:13a-:13b
(Supp. 1973). Other statutes demand that violations be serious or mate-
rially endanger the health and safety of tenants. See, e.g., PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon Supp. 1973); VA. CODE § 55-248.39(a)
(Supp. 1975).
23. -A Minnesota tenant may safely invoke all or part of the whole
statutory apparatus of tenants' rights and remedies at any level of gov-
ernment, including the institution of the special proceeding by which to
compel the landlord to perform repairs. See MINN. STAT. §§ 566.20-.33
(1976). A landlord is protected from harassment by the requirement
that the tenant exercise good faith in the pursuit of his rights. See note
1 supra.
Unlike some statutes, see, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 33-1491 (C) (2)
(Supp. 1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(a) (West Supp. 1976); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 70-7-40 (A) (2) (Supp. 1975), Minnesota's statute allows the
tenant to assert the retaliatory eviction defense even when the tenant
has withheld rent, providing the rent is paid into court. See Parkin v.
Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 1976); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn.
54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973). Two additional significant matters relating to
needed protection for tenants are not covered by the statute. First, large
corporate landlords owning multiple dwellings may have considerable
influence over rental rates and housing conditions in a locality, and they
may also have the ability to harass tenants persistently and in numerous
ways. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1972). The statute should therefore specifically prohibit retaliation
against a tenant of such a landlord who joins with other tenants in a
tenant union or organization. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (a) (3)
(1975); ARz. REv. STAT. § 33-1491 (A) (3) (Supp. 1976); MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (a) (2) -(3) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 230 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
University Community Properties, Inc. v. Norton, 246 N.W.2d 858
(Minn. 1976), a recent decision denying collective bargaining rights to
tenant unions, need not be construed to limit the possibilities for such
groups in the future. Indeed the court narrowed its holding by stating
that it would refuse to create common law collective bargaining rights
and implied that it would accept legislative initiative on the matter.
Collective action by tenants also falls within the ambit of their con-
stitutional rights, but, in view of the obstacles to showing state action
in violation of the fourteenth amendment, legislative protection of tenant
unions is the preferred solution. See note 17 supra.
The second issue which neither the statute nor the Minnesota court
has addressed is the damages to which a tenant who is unlawfully
evicted or who successfully defends a summary possession action is enti-
tled. See Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828, 833 n.6 (Minn. 1976) (ex-
pressly declining to consider question of damages). Although the present
statute specifically concerns only defenses to unlawful detainer actions
and not independent damage actions by tenants who have been unlaw-
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proaches exemplified by Toms Point and Edwards, although pro-
viding impetus for protective state legislation, remain important
only in states that have not yet enacted retaliatory eviction stat-
utes.
2 4
Tenants could not avail themselves of comprehensive statu-
tory protection, however, in the absence of solutions to the
conceptually difficult problems of ascertaining the existence and
legal significance of a landlord's retaliatory motive. Because the
most basic problem confronting the tenant is proving that the
landlord had any retaliatory motive at all, the success of the
defense depends in general on the ease with which the tenant
can establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Even when the tenant establishes retaliatory motive, a
landlord will invariably deny retaliation and submit evidence of
other justifications for evicting. A court must then determine
whether the landlord's nonretaliatory reasons should prevail to
permit the eviction, for it may sometimes be desirable to give
effect to a landlord's nonretaliatory purposes in spite of his
coexisting desire to retaliate.25 Further, a landlord's motives
can be scrutinized with varying degrees of rigor: courts could
require the landlord to produce nonretaliatory justification for
the eviction and ignore the question of whether his retaliatory
motive caused the eviction, attempt to determine which of the
two motivations actually brought about the eviction, or bypass
the causation question altogether by denying eviction where any
retaliatory motive was present. The diversity of statutory and
fully forced to leave, fairness requires that a tenant who, perhaps
through ignorance or indigency, did not interpose a retaliatory eviction
defense be guaranteed a cause of action for damages. Since the disrup-
tive effects of an eviction may be excessively burdensome for the tenant,
many states provide for double or treble damages or two or three times a
designated amount of rent. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp.
1976); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5516(d) (Supp. 1976). Such exemplary damage
awards not only compensate tenants but deter landlords from evicting
unlawfully. At the minimum, a tenant who successfully defends an un-
lawful detainer action could receive reimbursement by the landlord for
legal fees; statutes in some states so provide. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (c) (Supp. 1975); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720
(2) (West Supp. 1976).
24. The Toms Point-Edwards approaches might be useful in North
Carolina, for example, where the absence of legislation and the restric-
tive and traditionalist views of trial courts have jeopardized the future
of the defense in that state. See Note, Landlord and Tenant-Prohibition
of Retaliatory Eviction in Landlord-Tenant Relations: A Study of Prac-
tice and Proposals, 54 N.C.L. REv. 861, 862 (1976).
25. See notes 51-52 infra and accompanying text.
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case-law standards addressing this problem, developed independ-
ently but roughly simultaneously in various jurisdictions, reflects
the difficulty of assessing motive and purpose and the necessity
for balancing the divergent interests of landlord and tenant.
As measured by their effect on a tenant's problems of
proof, judge-made standards for determining retaliatory intent
range from the extraordinarily stringent to the excessively le-
nient. In Dickhut v. Norton,26 for example, the Wisconsin court
held that a tenant could prevail only by proving through clear and
convincing evidence that a housing code violation existed, that
the landlord knew of the tenant's report to the housing authori-
ties, and that the landlord's sole purpose for evicting was retalia-
tion.27  The Dickhut test is extremely restrictive, since few
people act from a single isolated motive, and any landlord can
find some nonretaliatory reason for the eviction, no matter how
frivolous.28  The Toms Point test 29 treats the tenant with equal
harshness, since it requires a defendant to prove, inter alia, that
infringement of his constitutional rights was the landlord's over-
riding reason for the eviction.30 In addition, the test has limited
applicability for other jurisdictions because in many cases a
tenant's constitutional rights will not be involved; retaliation is
most likely to follow a tenant's pursuit of his rights under state
law or local housing codes. 31
At the opposite extreme from Dickhut and Toms Point are
cases such as Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.32 and Silberg
26. 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
27. Id. at 396, 173 N.W.2d at 302.
28. For a thorough discussion and criticism of the Dickhut case, see
Note, Landlord and Tenant-Burden of Proof Required to Establish De-fense of Retaliatory Eviction, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 939, 944-50.
29. See note 18 supra.
30. Id.
31. While a tenant's pursuit of his rights under state law or local
housing codes probably would be considered an exercise of a constitu-
tional right under the Toms Point approach in New York, it is doubtful
whether similar tenant action in other states would be held to be within
the purview of the Constitution. For criticism of the Dickhut and Toms
Point approaches, see Player, Motive and Retaliatory Eviction of Tenants,
1974 U. ILL. L. F. 610. Further, the requirement of a grievance exist-
ing at the time the possessory action is brought, see note 18 supra, appar-
ently designed to protect landlords from harassment for nonexistent de-
fects, is open to abuse. If a landlord kept the premises in a state of disre-
pair and forced the tenants to enforce their rights, the latter would have
no defense were the landlord suddenly to repair the defects and evict the
tenants. The state of repair is irrelevant in applying the Minnesota stat-
ute. See MINN. STAT. §§ 566.03 (2)-.03 (4) (1976).
32. 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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v. Lipscomb.33 In Robinson, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals applied a "legitimate business purpose" test:
in order to rebut the presumption of retaliatory motive which
arises when his acts are "inherently destructive" of tenants'
rights, a landlord must show a valid business motivation.3 4 The
Silberg court held that a landlord may evict a tenant only when
the landlord can show that "the decision to evict was reached
independent [sic] of any consideration of the activities of the
tenant protected by the statute."3 5 From a tenant's perspective,
these tests are ideal, since under either the court will rigorously
scrutinize the economic justification offered by the landlord.3 6
State retaliatory eviction statutes also prescribe tests for
determining the legal significance of a retaliatory purpose. In
33. 117 N.J. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (Union County Ct. 1971).
34. 463 F.2d at 867. The court in Robinson simply stated its test
without suggesting any rational procedure for determining the legitimacy
of a landlord's business purpose; without firm guidelines, judges or juries
with little business expertise and pro-tenant sympathies could be un-
duly harsh on landlords. The case has been widely criticized; see, e.g.,
Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Eviction Based Upon Ten-
ant Rent Withholding as a Result of Housing Code Violations is Unlaw-
ful and May be Raised as a Defense in an Action by Landlord for Pos-
session, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1119 (1973); cf. Player, supra note 31, at 624
(retaliatory eviction is analogous to discrimination in an employer-
employee relationship).
35. 117 N.J. Super. at 496, 285 A.2d at 88. Despite the voluminous
evidence of his elaborate plans for improving and selling the property
that the landlord presented at trial, the Silberg court nonetheless found
that the landlord had not rebutted a presumption of retaliation because
he had not fully considered the economic feasibility or possibility of do-
ing the work with the tenants still in possession. Id. The court was
not satisfied that the landlord had acted from purely economic motives;
had the tenants not engaged in protected activity, the landlord would
have given more serious consideration to doing the work with the tenants
present.
The court's reasoning contained two unambiguous errors. First, it
assumed that acting from an economic judgment that is less than per-
fectly rational implies the presence in the actor's mind of a retaliatory
or otherwise "bad" purpose. Since people frequently make decisions
based on incomplete information and intuitive judgments, to infer that
the gaps in a person's economic decisionmaking represent illicit motives
demands more imagination than logic. Second, the court found it un-
necessary to inquire whether, if the tenants had not engaged in protected
activity, they would have been evicted anyway. Yet this inquiry is pre-
cisely what the body of the court's analysis compelled. To say that a
landlord brought an action for possession without considering the ten-
ants' activities is to say that he would have evicted them regardless of
their conduct.
36. See notes 34-35 supra.
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California, a landlord may not successfully bring a summary
possession action if his "dominant purpose" is retaliation for the
tenant's exercise of his legal rights.3 7 The Michigan statute
prohibits eviction if it was "intended primarily as a penalty" for
the tenant's assertion of his rights or for his complaining to a
housing code enforcement agency, or if it was "intended primar-
ily as retribution for any other lawful act arising out of the
tenancy."8
A final approach to judging landlord intent is the concept of
eviction "for cause," in which eviction is permitted only for
specified causes and denied for all other reasons. For cause
eviction statutes safeguard tenant interests almost as effectively
as do the Robinson and Silberg tests but have a distinct advan-
tage over those tests because they eliminate much uncertainty.
Apparently no state has accepted the for cause concept in its
pure form; 39 some states, however, have enacted hybrid statutes
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (a) (West Supp. 1976). Overlapping leg-
islative and judicial remedies have confused the retaliatory eviction law
of California. A common law defense was established in Schweiger v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970), a
case decided after the legislature had enacted section 1942.5 but prior
to its effective date. Schweiger required the tenant to establish an ac-
tual retaliatory motive; this demand is apparently less exacting than the
statutory requirement of a dominant retaliatory purpose. The Schweiger
court, however, saw no inconsistency between its approach, which ex-
tends the range of tenants' rights beyond that specified in the statute,
and the approach of the statute itself. Id. at 516 n.4, 476 P.2d at 103
n.4, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 735 n.4. The California supreme court has not yet
resolved the ambiguity. See Comment, supra note 19, at 1167-81.
38. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720(1) (a)-(c) (West Supp.
1976). The Washington statute contains similar language. WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 59.18.240 (Supp. 1975). The Maryland statute, MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (a) (2) (Supp. 1976), however, is a variation
on the Dickhut "sole purpose" test.
39. The history of attempts in Ohio to enact a for cause eviction
bill considered ideal by tenants' rights advocates is described in Blum-
berg, The Ohio Struggle With the Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant
Act, 7 CLEARiNGHOUSE REV. 265 (1973). In the 1975 session of the Minne-
sota legislature, attempts were made to enact a statute to permit eviction
only for cause. Landlord opposition was so intense, however, that pro-
tenant forces in the legislature retreated and settled for the amendment
to the retaliatory eviction statute which added the "in whole or part"
language. Beneke Interview, supra note 4.
A statutory scheme that allows eviction only for specified causes
and denies it for all other reasons could significantly limit the freedom
of landlords to dispose of their property for their own benefit. For cause
eviction may also result in excessive litigation, since it completely re-
verses the existing framework of landlord-tenant regulation. Instead of
prohibiting eviction for a class of proscribed motives and allowing it for
all others, for cause eviction places an enormous burden on the landlord
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which list both some prohibited and some permissible motives.40
The 1971 Minnesota statute contained an evidentiary stand-
ard for weighing evidence of retaliatory intent, but no substan-
tive standard; nevertheless, it was efficacious in solving many
of the tenant's proof problems. The tenant was required to show
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the eviction was
intended to penalize him for having engaged in some activity pro-
tected by the statute, but where the notice to quit came within
90 days of the tenant's acts, the statute shifted both the burdens
of production and persuasion to the landlord.41  Since the ten-
ant's direct evidence of a landlord's subjective motive is likely
to be tenuous at best, the statute allowed the tenant to base the
inference of retaliation on the close proximity in time between
the tenant's protected acts and service of the notice to quit. The
by requiring him to prove that he wants to evict for a reason that
falls within the permissible motives listed in the statute. A for cause
standard may, apart from any question of retaliatory motive, force land-
lords to defend frivolous charges of unlawful eviction. Stein Interview,
supra note 4.
For cause eviction would serve tenant interests but would unduly
restrict the landlord's property rights where no question of retaliation
is raised. It may therefore be preferable to specify the reasons for which
landlords may not evict rather than attempt to list the reasons for which
they may evict. Id.
40. The Connecticut for cause eviction statute permits evictions
where the tenant uses the premises for an illegal purpose or in violation
of the rental agreement, the landlord in good faith needs the dwelling
unit for his own immediate use, the tenant caused the conditions about
which he has complained, or the tenant complained after the landlord
had sent the notice to quit. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (b)
(1)- (4) (West Supp. 1977). Additional for cause reasons might in-
clude the landlord's desire to remodel the premises or make substantial
alterations, to take the unit off the market for at least six months, or
to sell the property. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310(c) (5)-(7)
(1975); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 33-1491 (C) (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT.
§ 70-7-40 (A) (1)- (2) (Supp. 1975); VA. CoDE § 55-248.39(c) (Supp.
1975). The New Jersey statute interpreted in the Silberg case contains
retaliatory eviction prohibitions similar to those in the Minnesota statute
but, in addition, allows evictions only for cause; an eviction without
cause creates a presumption of retaliation. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-
10.12 (West Supp. 1976). Unlike the New Jersey law, however, the other
statutes listing valid reasons for eviction have not been interpreted by
state courts.
41. The statute's burden of proof shift differs from an ordinary pre-
sumption in that the burdens of both production and persuasion are af-
fected. Generally, in civil cases, presumptions shift the burden of pro-
duction but do not shift the burden of persuasion, although the pre-
ferable view is that a presumption shifts both burdens. See C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 342-43, at 803-11 (2d ed. 1972). For a discussion
of the effect of the shifting of the burden in retaliatory eviction litiga-
tion, see note 56 infra.
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inference is strongest when the eviction closely follows the pro-
tected activity; eviction at that time is more likely to be a re-
sponse to the tenant's activities than if the notice to quit came
much later. In the absence of a statute, the proximity in time
alone might not be sufficient to make out a prima facie case of
retaliation. The statute therefore eased the tenant's burden by
allowing him to prevail when the landlord could not negate the
legislatively created inference. Placing the burden of producing
evidence of the motive for eviction on the landlord is appropriate,
for he is the party better able to meet that burden. He is more
likely than the tenant to have direct evidence of his own pur-
poses and, were the burden not on him, he would give up such
evidence reluctantly and piecemeal. When the landlord seeks to
take the dwelling unit off the market in order to make repairs,
for example, he can present evidence of plans made and expendi-
tures directed toward his project.
Since the statute did not define the type of proof required
to negate the inference, that task was left to the courts. In
Parkin v. Fitzgerald,42 decided almost contemporaneously with
the passage of the 1976 amendment to the statute,43 the su-
preme court construed the statute in its unamended 1971 form.
The standard the court adopted for determining when the bur-
den of proof had been met required a landlord to prove by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that he had a nonretaliatory
reason for the eviction, that the nonretaliatory reason was sub-
stantial, and that the substantial nonretaliatory reason arose "at
or within a reasonably short time before service of the notice to
quit. '44  A nonretaliatory reason was defined as one wholly
42. 240 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1976).
43. Parkin was decided on March 19, 1976. 240 N.W.2d at 829.
Strangely, neither the court nor the parties mentioned the fact that an
amendment to the statute had even been contemplated. The bill to
amend the statute, introduced in the 1975 Session, was delayed and car-
ried over into the 1976 Session, where it was passed. It was signed by
the Governor on February 20, 1976. House Journal, Minn. Legis., 69th
Sess., 4024 (1976) (message from Gov. Anderson). Since the bill con-
tained no definite effective date for the amendment, it became law on
August 1, 1976, under a Minnesota provision covering such legislation,
MNN. STAT. § 645.02 (1976). Thus, Parkin controlled for only a lit-
tle over four months.
On only one occasion during the five-year interval between the origi-
nal enactment of the statute and the Parkin case was the court con-
fronted with the question of retaliatory eviction, but in that case the ac-
tions for which the tenant was evicted were illegal and the statutory
defense was held inapplicable. See Olson v. Bowen, 291 Minn. 546, 192
N.W.2d 188 (1971).
44. 240 N.W.2d at 832.
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unrelated to and unmotivated by any good faith, statutorily
protected activity by the tenant.45
The "substantial nonretaliatory reason" test,46 designed to
strike a balance between protecting the tenant and permitting
45. Id. at 833. The application of the statute and the court's test
to the facts of Parkin was straightforward and unambiguous. Four
months after entering into an oral month-to-month lease, the tenants re-
minded their landlord of the promise he had made at the time of leasing
to make certain repairs. Id. at 829. Two weeks later, when the repairs
were not made, tenants obtained an inspection of their dwelling by the
local housing code enforcement agency. As a result, the agency reported
several housing code violations to the landlord, including the absence
of handrails on staircases, screens on windows, and dead bolt locks on
doors, as well as significant deterioration of kitchen and plumbing facili-
ties. Id. at 829-30. After receiving this notification, the landlord gave
the tenants 30 days notice to quit the premises. The tenants refused to
vacate, however, and withheld their rent. The landlord responded with
an unlawful detainer suit. At trial, the tenants contended that the sole
reason for their eviction was the landlord's wish to retaliate for their
having reported code violations to housing authorities. The landlord
countered with three justifications. First, on one occasion the tenants
paid the landlord with a check that the bank returned later for insuffi-
cient funds, although they eventually paid the landlord the rent in full.
Second, the rent withheld because of the landlord's failure to make re-
pairs had not been paid. Third, the landlord had complained several
times to the tenants about their owning a dog. The trial court made
no findings as to the landlord's motivation for evicting and rejected the
tenants' defense on the ground that the oral agreement creating the ten-
ancy provided for termination on 30 days notice, and the notice had been
properly served. Id.
The supreme court reversed the trial court, easily dismissing the
landlord's proffered justifications. The bad check was not a valid reason
to evict since the overdue rent was eventually paid in full, and the inci-
dent occurred five months before the eviction, thus working an estoppel
against the landlord. The rent due for the current month but withheld
because of the landlord's failure to make repairs was properly withheld
under Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973), and, pur-
suant to the disposition of the case on appeal, was paid into the trial
court. 240 N.W.2d at 833. Finally, despite the landlord's complaints
about the tenants' dog, the court found no evidence in the record that
the oral lease had prohibited pets, that the landlord had protested when
the tenants got the dog, or that the dog had caused any damage to the
premises. The court found that the landlord's failure to overcome the
statutory inference of retaliation (which it incorrectly termed a presump-
tion, see note 41 supra) compelled the conclusion that the tenants were
illegally evicted. 240 N.W.2d at 833.
46. The court did not elaborate on the meaning of "substantial."
Assuming that the test is intended to discern what role the landlord's
motives played in his decision-making process, the test of substantiality
could be either subjective or objective. A subjective test would focus
on the landlord's own perception of the strength and persuasiveness of
the nonretaliatory reason as compared to his other reasons. An objective
test would compel an inquiry into the landlord's nonretaliatory motives
from the perspective of a reasonable person, focusing on whether, in the
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landlords to control their property for their own economic bene-
fit, falls in the middle range of retaliatory motive standards. It
does not require a tenant to prove, as did the Wisconsin court in
Dickhut, that the landlord's sole purpose was retaliation, 47 nor
does it require him to establish a hierarchical ordering of the
landlord's motives to prove that retaliation was the landlord's
dominant or overriding purpose, as the California, Michigan,
and Washington statutes require.48  Unlike those statutes, the
substantial nonretaliatory reason test focuses on the strength of
the landlord's independent nonretaliatory motives rather than on
the relationship of such motives to the landlord's retaliatory
motive.40
That the Minnesota court viewed a landlord's economic
motives more generously than did the Robinson and Silberg
light of ordinary experience, the motive was independently significant.
The tenor of the Parkin opinion suggests that the court contemplated
the objective test. The test would concentrate on the independent and
objective validity of the landlord's good motives, rather than on the rela-
tionship of his good motives to his bad motives, as suggested by the
court's examples of substantial nonretaliatory motives: nonpayment of
rent, other material breach of lease covenants, and tenant damage to the
premises. 240 N.W.2d at 833. Any other result would frustrate the stat-
utory objective; if the landlord's nonretaliatory reasons were scrutinized
from the landlord's perspective, the landlord would be able to evict, for
example, when he disapproved of a tenant's personal idiosyncracies, even
though they did not harm the landlord or the other tenants.
The substantial nonretaliatory reason test could arguably be charac-
terized as a form of "dominant purpose" test. See text accompanying
note 37 supra. A landlord may have both a significant retaliatory motive
and a substantial nonretaliatory motive arising at or within a reasonably
short time of the sending of the notice to quit. Under a dominant purpose
test, he might be unable to evict if the retaliatory motive outweighed
the other in his decision; under the substantial nonretaliatory reason test
he could evict.
47. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. Because the tenant
is unlikely to have any direct proof of the landlord's subjective intent,
see text accompanying notes 41-42 supra, a rule that treated the inference
as merely procedural and stripped away the statutory inference of re-
taliatory intent once the landlord presented evidence to the contrary
would put the tenant in the same position as if there were no protective
statute. That is, the trier of fact would weigh whatever unaided infer-
ences about the landlord's motives could be drawn from the tenant's ac-
tivities and their closeness in time to the notice to quit against the direct
evidence of his own motives that the landlord could supply. Thus, the
policies underlying the shift of both the burdens of production and per-
suasion, see note 41 supra, would be best served by considering the statu-
tory inference of retaliation as an item of proof in the tenant's case. In
a jury trial, the jury should be instructed concerning the existence of
the inference of retaliation and its effect on the landlord's burden of
production and persuasion. See McCoxmicK, supra note 41, § 345, at 822.
48. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 46 supra.
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courts is illustrated by its discussion of the business reasons that
might justify removing a unit from the market. In contrast to
the Robinson court, whose single example of a "legitimate busi-
ness purpose" was the economic infeasibility of repairing the
premises to conform to the housing code,50 the Minnesota court
suggested that removal of a housing unit from the market for "a
sound business reason" would suffice as a reason "wholly
unrelated to and unmotivated by" the tenant's protected activi-
ty.51 Impossibility of repair would not be the only justifiable
basis for taking the unit off the market. It may be economically
rational, for example, and therefore a "sound business reason"
under the court's test, for the landlord to remove the unit to
make substantial improvements or alterations or to sell the prop-
erty altogether. Leasing the property may be unprofitable for
reasons unrelated to the exacting standards of housing codes:
rising taxes and expenses for fuel, maintenance, and utilities may
have eliminated the landlord's profit.52 The court's open-ended
example and the required proximity in time between the sub-
stantial nonretaliatory reasons and the decision to evict demon-
strates the court's willingness to treat landlords fairly, while still
limiting their power to evict. This basic fairness is missing from
the Silberg test,53 which requires the complete absence of retalia-
tory motive and, where such a motive is present, condemns the
eviction even if it can be justified on sound economic grounds.5 4
A test similar to the Silberg approach, however, soon sup-
planted the moderate Parkin standard. Only four months after
the decision, the 1976 amendment to the retaliatory eviction
statute became effective. Despite the almost concurrent enact-
ment of the statute and the decision of the case,55 neither the
50. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). Whether infeasibility refers to financial inability or to the
exercise of some discretion on the landlord's part is not clear from the
opinion. The former interpretation is more consistent with the court's
general harshness toward the landlord and serious regard for the retalia-
tory eviction defense. See Comment, Eviction from Substandard Hous-
ing and a Presumption of Retaliatory Motivation-Fairness for Both Ten-
ant and Lordlord: Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 44 U. COLo. L.
REv. 463, 470 (1973).
51. Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1976).
52. The economic and financial pressures on landlords are greater
in rent-controlled housing markets than in non-rent-controlled jurisdic-
tions such as Minnesota. See Landlord's Plight: Controls, High Costs,
Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 3.
53. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
54. The test has been endorsed by only one writer. See Note, supra
note 24, at 874-75.
55. See note 43 supra.
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court nor the legislature appears to have considered the merits of
the other's approach to the problem. The amendment minimiz-
es the tangle of causation and motivation issues by prohibiting
evictions where the landlords motive is retaliatory "in whole or
part."
Juxtaposing the court's interpretation of the original statute
with the legislature's significant amendment of the precise point
interpreted illuminates the possible consequences of the new
provision and some of its weaknesses. In a number of cases, the
Parkin test and the new amendment would yield the same result.
Under neither test, for example, would the tenant be punished
for pursuing his legal rights where the landlord could offer no
more than frivolous or transparently make-weight reasons for an
eviction. The two tests nevertheless approach many important
problems from different perspectives and would frequently
produce divergent results. In a case in which the tenant estab-
lishes the inference of retaliation by showing that the notice to
quit was served within 90 days of his protected acts, to which
the landlord offers plausible valid reasons in rebuttal, the amend-
ed statute provides that evidence of even a partially retaliatory
purpose, such as a conversation in which the landlord indicated
some degree of displeasure with the tenants' legal activism,
would support a finding that the landlord had not overcome the
inference. 56 Under a substantial nonretaliatory reason test,
however, where the landlord introduces evidence strongly proba-
tive of such a reason, the tenant, in order to establish that the
landlord has not rebutted the inference of retaliation, would
have to show either that the reason given was insubstantial or
was not developed independently of any consideration of the ten-
ant's activity.57
56. The allocation of the burden of proof in the Minnesota statute
raises a difficult evidentiary issue: whether the proximity in time be-
tween service of the notice to quit and the protected acts should continue
to have any probative value after the landlord has introduced evidence
that the eviction was not motivated in whole or part by a retaliatory
purpose. The question is thus whether the facts on which the statutory
inference of retaliation is based should be considered by the trier of fact
as the substance of the tenant's case or merely a procedural device to
force the landlord to come forward with evidence that the eviction was
not retaliatory. See note 47 supra.
57. In each of the hypotheticals discussed in the text, the tenant
will have greater proof problems when he cannot present direct evidence
that the landlord had a retaliatory motive. The most common evidence
a tenant will present is his first-hand experience of the landlord's
irritation with his legal activism. The tenant's difficulties will be
exacerbated if he has dealt with the landlord at arm's length, as is
frequently the case with large professional or corporate landlords, or
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When the notice to quit is served later than 90 days after
the tenant has engaged in protected acts or when there is a
retaliatory increase in rent or decrease in services, the tenant
bears the burden of proving the landlord's motive was retaliato-
ry.58 Under the amended statute, the burden is not difficult to
meet, since the tenant can establish his defense by presenting
evidence of any retaliatory purpose. If the tenant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the eviction was partly retal-
iatory, the landlord's attempt to rebut by demonstrating a co-
existing nonretaliatory reason will be unavailing. Under the
substantial nonretaliatory reason test, however, even if the tenant
introduced sufficient proof to establish retaliation, proof of a
concomitant substantial nonretaliatory reason would permit the
landlord to overcome the defense.
The landlord's dilemma can be clearly illustrated by assum-
ing a case in which he evicts because he wants to use the prem-
ises for himself or his family, but at the same time he admits
having 'a retaliatory motive or there is sufficient evidence to
warrant a finding that he acted for a retaliatory purpose. Based
on the examples given as dicta in the Parkin case,59 he could
have argued under the old statute that eviction in order to obtain
the use of the dwelling for himself or his family was a removal of
the unit from the market for a sound business reason, an expla-
nation likely to be credited if it would be less expensive for him
or his family to live in the unit presently occupied by the
tenant.60  But under the amended statute, he would certainly
not prevail; his justifiable reasons for eviction would simply be
irrelevant. The "in whole or in part" standard thus makes
proof of nonretaliation extremely difficult and may deprive land-
lords of the flexibility they need to manage their property advan-
tageously.
The amended statute also exacerbates the problem of the
"perpetual tenant" who, after successfully asserting a retaliatory
eviction defense, could remain in possession indefinitely by alleg-
ing retaliation in each subsequent eviction attempt. 61 While the
when he has a history of amicable relations with the landlord which
would tend to weaken the inference of retaliation.
58. M N. STAT. § 566.03 (1976); see note 1 supra.
59. 240 N.W.2d at 833. See note 46 supra.
60. A court in at least one other jurisdiction has accepted this
reasoning. See Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158, 342 A.2d 886
(1975).
61. The perpetual tenant issue was raised but quickly dismissed
in the Edwards opinion, 397 F.2d at 702-03. The court recognized that
a tenant could possibly stay indefinitely, but suggested that the land-
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prospect of the perpetual tenant may be more theoretical than
real,62 it is a problem with which few jurisdictions have dealt
adequately.
Minnesota's amended statute provides tenants with ex-
traordinary protection from subsequent evictions. A landlord
who tries to evict a tenant within 90 days of the initial successful
assertion of a retaliatory eviction defense, for example, will
confront an allegation of retaliation based not just on the statu-
tory inference but also on his recently proven retaliatory mo-
tive.63 Even a notice to quit served 91 days after the first
assertion of the defense might not be sufficiently removed from
the original retaliation to escape the conclusion that the landlord
was again motivated, at least in part, by retaliation. Generally, a
significant period of time will have to elapse before a landlord
could show that his proven retaliatory motive had completely
dissipated.
The substantial nonretaliatory reason test, on the other
hand, gives him a better opportunity to offer other legitimate
justification for a subsequent eviction.64 His personal and fi-
lord could evict when his illicit motive was dissipated. The court stated
that these fact questions could be resolved in the same manner as an-
alogous questions of when'an employer has ceased to regard an em-
ployee with animosity because of the latter's union activism. Although
neither the majority nor the dissent in Robinson mentioned the problem,
one author believes that the strict Robinson standard of landlord justifi-
cation for eviction (economic infeasibility of repair) makes it unlikely
that the landlord will be able to evict the tenant in the foreseeable
future. See Comment, supra note 19, at 1126-27. See also 82 HAnv. L.
REV. 932 (1969); 44 NoTRE DAME LAW. 286 (1968).
The Minnesota statute's emphasis on the landlord's retaliatory mo-
tive to the exclusion of his other motives leaves room for abuse of ten-
ants' rights by irresponsible tenants. A rowdy or destructive tenant, for
example, could remain in possession indefinitely by periodically engag-
ing in some activity at least colorably protected by the statute. If he
did so at least once every 90 days, he would always have the benefit
of the statutory inference of retaliation, which could be sufficient to re-
peatedly sustain the tenant's claim of retaliation even if the landlord in-
troduced evidence of a legitimate purpose.
62. Beneke Interview, supra note 4.
63. While it might be argued that the successful assertion of a
retaliatory eviction defense is not itself an act protected by the statute,
since it is not specifically mentioned in the list of protected acts, the
more plausible view is that assertion of the defense is an attempt to
"enforce rights" under state law. See MNN. STAT. § 566.03(2) (1) (1976);
note 1 supra.
64. Courts and juries would probably accept less rigorous justifica-
tion for subsequent evictions than was required in the initial unlawful
detainer action because the strength of the inference of retaliation will
itself diminish over time.
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nancial motives could change enough after 90 days that he could
prove legitimate nonretaliatory reasons. Although the distance in
time between the initial assertion of the defense and the subse-
quently attempted eviction slightly alters the context of the anal-
ysis, precisely the same considerations that make the substan-
tial nonretaliatory reason test preferable to the amendment in
other situations are persuasive here. The test compels an equit-
able evaluation of the relative strengths of the landlord's valid
right to control his property and the tenant's right to possession.6 5
These hypotheticals illustrate the significant bias against
landlords that the 1976 amendment introduced into the law. In
a great variety of situations landlords will have no opportunity to
justify a concededly retaliatory eviction regardless of the validity
or legitimacy of their justifications. The combination of the
statutory inference of retaliation and the "in whole or part"
language, which could in some cases create a nearly absolute
right of possession for tenants, may unduly restrict landlords'
freedom to control their property.
Solutions to the problems explored in this Comment are
essential to the formulation of an optimal retaliatory eviction
remedy. The principal criterion by which such a remedy should
be judged is fairness in accommodating the conflicting interests
of landlords and tenants.66 The law must recognize that every-
one acts for good as well as bad motives and that the equities are
never entirely on one side or the other. The 1976 amendment,
although it may, as its proponents contend, force trial courts to
take retaliatory eviction defenses more seriously, also results in
unfair and arbitrary treatment of landlords. The amendment's
harshness will have to be diluted by future legislation requir-
ing courts to consider legitimate landlord reasons as well as
illicit ones. A substantial nonretaliatory reason test similar to
the Parkin test would compel courts to examine all facets of
landlord motivation and would permit judgments based on the
relative strength of divergent landlord and tenant interests in
particular cases.
65. For the same reasons, the substantial nonretaliatory reason
test also helps to solve the landlord's problem of evicting the tenant who
periodically engages in protected acts merely as a pretext for forestalling
eviction based on his otherwise objectionable conduct.
66. See Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973)
(requiring tenant to pay withheld rent into court during pendency of
legal proceedings under Mn'. STAT. § 504.18 (1976) (implied warranty
of habitability) and authorizing trial court to disburse such funds to
landlord as needed to perform minimal maintenance and meet property
obligations),
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